More and more journalists in Ukraine are gearing up. However, they are not arming themselves with conventional weapons on the front lines, but with new methods and digital tools. Their goal: to expose Russian propaganda and reveal its mechanisms.
One of them is Iryna Avramenko, a journalist and lecturer at the University of Customs and Finance in Dnipropetrovsk. In her book Deconstructors of Truth, she shows how deeply Russian disinformation has penetrated public discourse – even through seemingly independent, liberal media.
In this interview, she reveals how Russian – even liberal opposition – media spread propaganda and why the war must be understood not only as a military conflict, but also as an imperial cultural struggle.
Last year, you published the book Deconstructors of Truth together with Natalia Steblyna. The book explores how Russian opposition media report on the invasion of Ukraine. How did you come to write the book?
At the beginning of the full-scale invasion, Ukrainians hoped that Russian opposition media (both the so-called liberal media and opinion leaders) would be allies in the fight against the Putin regime. After all, they are supposedly against the war and condemn the Putin regime. They were welcome on Ukrainian television and radio. Soon it became clear that they were playing their own game. At first, they seem to be against the bloody war that the Russian authorities have unleashed. Just like the Putinists, they perceive Ukraine as a zone of Russian influence. They remain imperialists. This is because they were formed in the same appropriate cultural environment. For example, none of them said that Crimea, which was taken away from Ukrainians under the guise of a ‘referendum, must return to its rightful owner. However, many Ukrainians continued to listen to them and believe them.
It was also obvious that these ‘good Russians’ were trusted in the West, where they were regularly provided with platforms to promote their views and funding for their own projects. Instead of clear statements that there is no place for bloody empires in the modern world, we heard complaints about life. They say that sanctions against the Russians must be reintegrated into Western global politics, because this is ‘Putin’s war’. It became clear that we immediately had to open our eyes to the so-called Russian opposition. To prove their cunning we had to collect facts.
I devoted myself to this task with Natalia Steblyna. Steblyna is a professor at Vasyl’ Stus Donetsk National University and a well-known expert on propaganda. To be honest, in the process of analysing it, the cynicism of some representatives of the ‘liberal opposition’ shocked us. Our research got published by the Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy.
The book starts directly with the problems of Russian media. Right at the beginning you make it clear that Russian opposition media cannot be your allies in the information war. How is the current Russian opposition media landscape structured and in which formats and forms do they broadcast their news?
For the so-called ‘liberal’ media, the most famous among them are the Dozhd TV channel, Meduza, Mediazona and Novaya Gazeta Europe. Some of the journalists of these outlets actually worked under life-threatening conditions. In particular, Petro Verzilov, the former publisher of “Mediazona”, who joined the ranks of the Ukrainian Army (AFU). Unfortunately, these are exceptions rather than the rule. Many of the materials on these resources contain narratives typical of Russian state propaganda, including the idea of imperial revanchism. Another important part of the opposition media landscape is the content of opinion leaders with declared liberal views. We are talking about bloggers Yulia Latynina, Yuriy Dud, Dmytro Bykov, Kateryna Gordeeva and others, who have millions of followers around the world.
Even despite their opposition to the current government: The narrative of Russia’s greatness is a key narrative that continues to feed the pride of a large part of Russian society. Regardless of their intellectual or educational level. In this context, this content counts as a form of Russian propaganda. Not open and aggressive, like the official Kremlin rhetoric, but much more subtle and thus more dangerous. Representatives of intellectual and humanitarian circles promote propaganda messages disguised as high-quality cultural or analytical content.
These cases became the basis for the book. Our task was not only to record them, but also to analyse them. Especially given the fact that they are often either unknown or not discussed in Western discourse.
How can I recognise a propaganda medium?
Every propaganda source has their own tricks. First of all the media should not sketch out versions. If they are a serious media outlet, they should seek to understand the situation.
The media should avoid evaluative, stylistically coloured vocabulary and hate speech. Another painful point for me is the topic of the ‘balance of opinion’ during the war. In my opinion, the classic journalistic approach does not work in this case. Putting the pain of the victims and the statements of those who caused this pain on the same level is at least unethical.
I understand that it is easy to write about the war while being ‘above the process. However, believe me; it is quite different when the war is in your country. When bombs are falling on your city, your friends, relatives and children are dying.
You write that media outlets put themselves in formal opposition to Putin and criticize the Russian system. On the other hand, they do not oppose the imperial essence of the country. This creates an informational fog, in which they cannot be classified as a propaganda medium easily. What possibilities does this informational fog offer them and how does language in particular shift realities in the informational fog?
One of the main techniques of these media is to create the so-called ‘fog of war’. For example, after another war crime committed by Russia, these platforms often post two messages. From the Ukrainian side, stating that a missile hit a residential building. And from the Russian side, stating that a missile allegedly destroyed a military facility. No details, just a standard note: In wartime, it is impossible to verify the accuracy of information. As a result, the reader is left disoriented. Nobody knows if it’s about the death of civilians or the destruction of a weapons depot? The truth is devalued. It is presented as one of the versions. The purpose of such publications is to sow doubt in any news.
The information fog gives Russians many advantages. First, it makes people doubt that Russia is the aggressor. After all, many of the materials in the ‘opposition’ media make it impossible to understand whether war crimes have taken place or whether they are just someone’s invention.
Secondly, the narrative imposed by the ‘opposition’ that this is ‘Putin’s war’. Calling the Russian people “victims” completely confuses the Western audience and even evokes sympathy for the Russians. The media convince their audience that Russian soldiers are suffering and dying just like Ukrainians. In this way, they try to put an equal sign between the victim and the aggressor. It is a convenient and profitable position.
Why do you call it: not just Putin’s war?
According to a Levada Centre opinion poll, more than 70 percent of Russians support the so-called ‘special military operation’. This is hard to understand if you forget that ordinary Russians launch the missiles. The ammunition for them is not made by aliens, but by ordinary Russians.
Putin does not act in a vacuum – his policies are rooted in a cultural context. The Russian president is not an anomaly, but a direct product of the Russian historical and cultural tradition. This raises the question of not only personal but also collective responsibility. The responsibility of the society that allowed this to happen, supported it, or tacitly accepted it. Representatives of the so-called ‘liberal opposition’ oppose this approach. After all, it is much easier to convince the world that only one dictator is responsible, and that all others are as if on the sidelines, ‘white and fluffy’.
You also talk about an extended concept of propaganda that deals with the adaptation of cultural identities. In the last chapter of your book, you call for a reappraisal of the origins of Russian cultural assets. To what extent is the war in Ukraine also a cultural struggle?
I often hear the question: ‘What is wrong with Russian culture?’ However, this particular formulation is wrong from the very beginning.
The fact is that the so-called ‘Russian’ culture is not a purely Russian phenomenon. It is a collective culture of the empire, built on the absorption and appropriation of the achievements of enslaved peoples. Why did artists create in Russian? Why did they serve the imperial regime? Because they often had no choice. I can speak about the Ukrainian cultural elite. Those who tried to work creatively within their own cultural identity were destroyed. Physically or morally. We are not calling for the abolition of Russian culture. We are talking about its decolonisation. We are talking about returning the voice to those who were deprived of it. We are talking about restoring historical justice.
Russian propaganda is diverse and constantly adapts to new circumstances. How do you react to these adaptations in teaching and how is the deconstruction of propaganda taught?
Indeed, Russian propagandists are constantly inventing new tools to influence their audience. To ensure that our students are able to recognise manipulations and information traps, we are also constantly updating our approach to teaching. Firstly, we involve stakeholders in the learning process – professionals who work daily to expose hostile narratives in the media space. Their practical experience is extremely valuable for students.
Secondly, students themselves learn to search for and expose propaganda – sometimes in environments where it is not immediately noticeable: in computer games, online youth communities, and dating platforms. This develops analytical thinking and media literacy.
Thirdly, both students and teachers regularly attend training and masterclasses from leading Ukrainian and international experts. This allows them to keep abreast of new threats, approaches and countermeasures.
What impact has the war had on your teaching? To what extent is your teaching content changing?
The war has a direct impact. We, as teachers, face new challenges. Firstly, to teach that journalism should remain high-quality, honest, and responsible even in extraordinary circumstances. Even in times of war. To explain that we have no right to descend into hate speech. Also that we must avoid value judgements, emotional pressure and unfounded generalizations.
This is not easy. After all, many students have personal experience of loss: some have lost relatives at the front, some have lost their homes and some have lost their normal lives. But that is why we have to be there for them, not only as teachers but also as guides in the information field. New courses have been introduced, including ‘war journalism’, a course on information warfare and a course on ethical coverage of tragedies during the war for example.
What changes are you observing right now in the international media landscape when it comes to Russian propaganda?
As for official Russian propaganda, the world has already realised the threat. The world sees how Russia is using disinformation and manipulation to influence elections around the world and provoke artificial migration crises. Unfortunately, there is still no realisation that the so-called ‘good Russians’ are no less dangerous. It is like with ‘good policemen’: they look friendly, but their goal is the same as the ‘bad’ ones.
Can Russian opposition media ever become allies for Ukraine?
Before that, they need to understand a few important things: There is no place for empires in the modern world. There is no place in the modern world for wars of aggression.
Ukrainians are not the same people as Russians and not even ‘brothers’. We have our own language, our own history (apart from being in the empire together), our own literature, our own songs, musical instruments, cuisine, traditions, and national clothes. If many of us speak Russian, it is a consequence of Russian colonial oppression, not proof that we are ‘the same’.
In addition, they should understand that the ethnic minorities of the Russian Federation also have the right to exist and develop. Unfortunately, Russia not only exterminates their language and culture, but also physically destroys them by sending hundreds, if not thousands, of Buryats, Chechens, and Tatars to fight in the war with Ukraine. So far, I don’t see any real desire in them to realise this.
What responsibilities does the so-called West have in coming to terms with Russian propaganda? What must the West do to support Ukraine in this information war?
The West needs to realise that this is not a ‘war on Ukraine’. This is a war against the civilised world, against the values of democracy. Ukraine is just one of the fronts. If they don’t understand it now, it will be much more difficult later.
To end this interview on a positive note: Can you see solidarity from international media outlets?
Yes, for example, in Germany, where I have the opportunity to work in safety thanks to the ECPMF Programme, journalists are mostly aware of the situation. The same applies to journalists from other countries.. They follow the course of the military activities. They know about Russia’s war crimes and sympathise with us. And this makes me very happy. I thank you, friends!