A few days after the news broke of Alexei Navalny’s death in a Russian prison colony, his wife announced that she would “continue her husband’s work.” She is currently actively touring the world to promote his book, “Patriot” and spread the typical narratives of the Russian liberal crowd about “Putin’s war,” “innocent” Russian occupiers, and the suffering of people on both sides… 

She recently expressed outrage on X (formerly Twitter) about the EU’s plans to ban tourist visas for Russian citizens. She argued that “a distinction must be made between the responsibility of the regime and that of ordinary Russians.” On the same day, Russian drones attacked Poland. Navalnaya did not tweet any condemnations of the Kremlin’s actions.

Like her husband, she believes that Crimea should not be returned to Ukraine. She also disapproves of Western countries supplying Ukraine with weapons, and believes that Russians should not pay reparations to Ukrainians, because it is only Putin and his inner circle that are responsible for the war, and they, she says, should pay.

The Russian opposition figure has also gone on the offensive in the media. During a speech at a session of the European Parliament, she called for funding for Russian media outlets operating in exile. She questioned why the EU had allocated €5.5 million to support Radio Liberty, while Russian media had received nothing. Navalnaya’s speech caught the attention of Iryna Romaliyska, host of Nastoyashchee Vremya (a joint project of Radio Liberty and Voice of America), who posted an excerpt of the speech on her Facebook page.

Navalnaya asked, “How is it that the European Union decides to support American media outlets that work for Russia, but not Russian ones?” She believes that Russian media outlets report “the truth about the war,” while Ukrainian media experts constantly uncover various manipulations and even pro-Kremlin narratives in them.

Such statements by Navalnaya may resonate with Western audiences because they tend to be very uncritical of her. The opposition figure recently visited Australia, where the local media dubbed her a “fearless voice” and “the de facto leader of the Russian opposition.” In an interview with the American media outlet CBS News, she comes across as strong and determined. In it she says she is not afraid to risk her life. A year after Navalny’s murder, CNN quoted her as saying in a video message that she would fight for a “free, peaceful, and beautiful” Russia. 

Before the meeting between Trump and Putin in Alaska, Navalnaya was mentioned again in the international media in connection with a video in which she called for the release of Russian political activists, journalists, and Ukrainian civilians. However, the beginning of this video was surprising: it stated that peace agreements are not the most important thing. Even if they are reached, it will not be clear whether they will be implemented, and the parties will “accuse each other of violating them.” Therefore, the politician continued, something must be done that will “go down in history.” Specifically, an exchange must be carried out. In this context, war becomes a kind of backdrop here, who started it and who is waging it is irrelevant, because, according to Navalnaya, anyone can violate agreements – it’s all geopolitics, so let’s just try to free people. Yes, people need to be freed. However, in this case, as in many others, the politician manipulates the context by spreading the blame for the war on both Putin and Zelenskyy. 

Many people, including Western politicians, perceive Yulia Navalnaya as a prominent figure in the modern Russian opposition. They even place their hopes on her to contribute to the future democratization of this currently fascist state. Therefore, it is important for us in Ukraine to understand the basis of her political ambitions. Is she offering an effective political program or is she just imitating political activity? What exactly is she telling her audience about Russia’s full-scale war against Ukraine?

Is Navalnaya running for president?

Six months after her husband’s death, Yulia Navalnaya told the Russian service of the BBC that she would run for president if she returned to Russia. However, a month later, in an interview with the Russian opposition media outlet TV Rain (Dozhd), she added that she “had not said anything about running for president.” She said that the BBC journalist asked her if she would run for office, to which she replied in the affirmative. However, the Russian opposition figure noted that she does have political ambitions: “If the opportunity arises, I will run for leadership positions in Russia.” 

It is important to consider the context here because, in modern Russia, the political opposition and the liberal media have their own purpose: for a long time, they played the role of “controlled valves for releasing steam in society,” helping the Kremlin to imitate the existence of a democracy, while also embracing the idea of the so-called “Russkiy Mir.” 

According to Ukrainian experts V. Denysenko and V. Pyrovych, the Russian liberal media, “played a crucial role, together with arrests, in bringing part of society back into line after the Bolotnaya protests.” 

Now let’s recall a more recent protest action proposed by Navalnaya herself: “Noon Against Putin,” which took place on the day of Putin’s “election.” In a video address, the “leader” of the future Russia called on her supporters to go to the polls, stand there for a while, and then go home. While it’s hard to fathom, how anyone could conceive of such a “political action,” it was quite an effective tool for stabilizing the situation and benefiting the Kremlin. The opposition came out, let off some steam, and imitated political activity once again. Then, they calmly returned to the “stable,” thus legitimizing Putin’s next presidential term. In a video address on the election results, Navalnaya even called them all “winners,” praising them for participating in the protest.

The same game of opposition continues today, although now Russian liberals mostly play on the Western field. The West does not understand that the so-called opposition is incapable of offering an alternative to Putin. This is because the opposition simply bypasses the complex, yet fundamentally important, issues that must be resolved to eliminate Russian imperialism. 

Let’s analyze Yulia Navalnaya’s social media accounts to understand this “game of opposition.”

• Her X (Twitter) account, created on February 19, 2024, three days after her husband’s official date of death.
• Her Instagram account, which she has maintained since March 2014.

We did not take her Telegram channel into account because of its small audience; it was created in November 2024 and has just over 20,000 subscribers.

I downloaded all content from the aforementioned social networks, including statistics such as likes, retweets and comments, from the date when Alexei Navalny’s murder in a Russian prison was made public, up to September 1, 2025. I then analyzed several aspects of Yulia Navalnaya’s communication:

• Popularity Dynamics. After all, a politician must ensure that their posts reach the widest possible audience. They should look for relevant news stories and find ways to interest the audience in their ideas.
• The subject matter of posts. If it concerns political activity, then that should be at the forefront.
• Mentions of Ukraine: in the aforementioned interview with TV Rain (Dozhd), Navalnaya said that “in almost every speech… in every interview… she touches on the issue of war and Ukraine in one way or another.”
• Mentions of the war.

Her most popular posts are about her husband’s death, her son’s birthday, and her daughter’s graduation.

Yulia Navalnaya created her Instagram account in March 2014 and she now has over one million followers. Her “brand” is solely based on the fact that she is the widow of the late Navalny. Her Instagram bio states: “wife of the aforementioned citizen, the other politician, a diverse activist, that gentleman.” This plays at the fact that Putin was afraid of Navalny and therefore avoided mentioning his name. However, it seems that  Navalnaya still lacks her own identity, as this bio description remains unchanged.

Now let’s examine the popularity dynamics of her posts, considering those that have received more than 100,000 likes and comments, and analyze their topics. How many of these posts are about politics rather than her husband’s murder? 

The most popular post, written a few days after the murder, received over 700,000 likes and comments. Most of the posts are related to the topic of her husband’s death in one way or another and were created either in the first month after his death or serve as reminders: 40 days after his death, his birthday, one year after his death, etc. Another popular topic is Alexei Navalny’s autobiography, which Yulia Navalnaya occasionally promotes on social media. 

The other four posts are about her personal life. One of her five most popular posts is a congratulatory message to her daughter for receiving her diploma. Her followers also liked posts about her son’s birthday, and holiday greetings for New Year’s and Easter, none of which contain political statements.

This leaves five political posts. One of them, posted the day after her husband’s murder, read “I will continue Alexei’s work,” and received more than 275,000 likes and comments. The other, less popular posts were about the elections in Russia and the dam breach in the Orenburg region, which we will discuss later. 

Yes, in addition to the above-listed posts, Navalnaya’s Instagram account has other posts about politics. However, they do not go viral, even though the politician often encourages sharing them. In other words, this social network is better suited for sharing personal stories. 

The situation on the social network X is very similar. Most of the popular posts were created in February and March 2024, shortly after Alexei Navalny’s murder. Political posts include calls to join the aforementioned “Noon Against Putin” campaign, photos from the event, and reposts of photos of Russian political prisoners after their release. There are also congratulations to Ukrainian director Mstyslav Chernov on winning an Oscar. Personal posts are the same as on Instagram. 

The conclusion drawn from analyzing the politician’s social media is simple: aside from Alexei Navalny’s death, they were unable to offer anything equally important.

The popularity of posts tends to decline over time

Now, let’s examine the popularity dynamics of the posts. In my opinion, it is very telling, with disappointing results for Yulia Navalnaya’s team. 

Interest in the politician’s posts remained relatively high until June 2024, with one in five subscribers seeing her posts. On June 17, a post about her daughter’s diploma received a large number of views, as we recall. 

This was followed by a slight surge of interest in the topic of political prisoners (August 1 and 8). By the end of 2024, interest in the posts ranged from 20,000 to 60,000. The New Year’s greeting post received the most views, with over 114,000.

Popular posts in 2025 include the anniversary of Navalny’s death and her son’s birthday. 

Now, let’s look at the X network. The situation here is similar.

There are many posts in 2024, and they are initially popular. For example, in the days immediately following the murder: posts dated February 19-22, the farewell post on March 1, the “Noon Against Putin” campaign, 40 days after Navalny’s death, and all the others mentioned above. Compared to 2024, the average post in 2025 receives a little over three thousand likes, comments, and reposts. 

Why does the posts’ dynamic look like this? 

Immediately after Alexei Navalny’s death in the prison colony was made public, Navalnaya and her team used social networks extensively to disseminate information about it. Importantly, opinion leaders were also involved. After all, forming alliances with potential partners is crucial for a politician, lacking the necessary resources such as an audience, to fight back.

“Noon Against Putin” is the only truly powerful political action carried out on Yulia Navalnaya’s social media. The post about it received over 21,000 reactions and reached more than 1.1 million people. This means that it was seen by three times as many users as subscribers. Why? Because the event took place a month after Alexei Navalny’s death, it gained significant traction by inertia. 

However, the post about the Russian opposition march in Berlin, which Navalnaya called for people to join six months later, in November, has more modest figures. They also tried to recruit opinion leaders, such as Vladimir Kara-Murza and Ilya Yashin, for this campaign. Out of Navalnaya’s million-strong Instagram audience, about 14,000 subscribers responded to her call to attend the rally in some way whether through likes or comments. A similar post on X received nearly 6,000 reactions and 244,000 impressions.

In general, we conclude that Navalnaya did not manage to create viral content on either Instagram or X after March 2024, because her posts had a significantly lower reach than the number of her subscribers. This was also reflected in the popularity of certain political initiatives launched through the politician’s page. Clearly, in addition to honoring the memory of the deceased opposition figure, it is important to present the audience with other significant topics.

War and Putin – because of corruption

Now, let’s take a closer look at Navalnaya’s posts. We will focus on her posts on X because political topics are discussed more frequently there than on Instagram. Often, the posts themselves are duplicates.

Alexei Navalny’s and his team’s main complaint against Putin is not the wars that Russia has waged and continues to wage, nor is it political persecution and the suppression of rights and freedoms. The main complaint is theft. Navalny used to work on convincing Russians that everything would be fine if the authorities did not steal. He called the leading Russian party, Edinaya Rossiya (United Russia), a “party of crooks and thieves.” The controversial film The Traitors, released by Alexei Navalny’s colleague Maria Pevchikh after his death, also addresses this issue. Set in the 1990s, the film suggests that Russia would not have suffered these consequences if the elites of the time had not stolen. According to Alexei Navalny and his team, the answer to the question of how to change Russia for the better after Putin, boils down to preventing former corrupt officials from coming to power. 

In other words, Navalny and his team are focusing on corruption in Russia, while the country’s wars remain in the background. Recall the Anti-Corruption Foundation (FBK, Russia) May 2023 investigation, “Who is stealing from rocket manufacturing.” The main topic was embezzlement in the defense industry. The deaths of Ukrainian civilians were mentioned in passing. However, a strange paradox emerged: Putin and his propaganda machine claim to have lifted the defense industry “from its knees” – an expression commonly used by Russian populists to mean extreme economic development and prosperity – yet they are simultaneously stealing from it. This is portrayed as very bad. According to this investigation, turns out, the situation would improve if they weren’t stealing?! Would it allow them to conduct their aggression more effectively?! 

Yulia Navalnaya’s recent political posts convey a clear message: the government should not steal, people should have decent salaries and pensions, and they should also… live comfortably. 

In a post about the dam breach in the Orenburg region, for example, she writes: 

“The state should be for the people. Mayors, governors, and the president should focus on making the country a comfortable place to live. That is their only task. But this government cannot cope with that task.”

It is telling that during the war her country is waging, the “comfort” of its citizens is at the forefront. The post does not mention the war at all. Why? Because, for Navalnaya’s team, the war and Putin’s regime are about money. If money were redistributed correctly, everyone would live in comfort and peace.

Here is another example of a post: “This government has huge houses and yachts, billions in stolen money, an army and propaganda, but they lack the most important thing – love for Russia and the desire to change our country for the better.” In other words, if they loved Russia and didn’t steal, there wouldn’t be any problems.

At the same time, Navalnaya is convinced that changes in Russia can happen quickly: “Russia will become completely different and will surprise everyone with how quickly these changes take place.” In a post about a meeting with Polish politicians, she wrote: “Both Lech Wałęsa and Adam Michnik firmly believe in rapid changes for the better in Russia.” 

Shortly after her husband’s death, Navalnaya wrote a Washington Post column titled “Putin is not a politician, he is a gangster.” In it, she said that her husband knew from the very beginning that the Kremlin dictator and his accomplices were thieves. “For criminal leaders, money is the most important thing. Putin doesn’t care that ordinary people in both Ukraine and Russia are suffering,” she wrote. Her solution is to deprive Putin and his entourage of money. Then, she says, support for the war will not be as high. She also suggests, of course, giving money not only to Ukraine and its army, but also to Russians who “continue to resist within Russia.”

Below is her post about the fall of the Assad regime in Syria: “For years, Putin showered Assad with money that he took from our pockets. Russian soldiers died for the sake of the Assads’ luxurious lifestyle.”

In other words, Putin is to blame for everything because he stole money from Russians. Because of this, “innocent Russian boys,” who committed numerous war crimes, including in Syria, died. 

It’s apparent that Navalnaya perceives the reasons for the full-scale Russian invasion in the same way: Putin is waging war in order to steal money. The missiles are being built more for theft than for fighting. Russian soldiers are also victims of this scheme.

Thus, Russian “oppositionists” ignore the real reasons for the full-scale war: the intent to destroy the Ukrainian nation and the elimination of the Ukrainian state forever. Or, as Eva Thompson says, Russians, as always, see social injustice, yet remain blind when it comes to their state’s attempts to eliminate other nations.

Putin is to blame for everything, and there is a “civil society” in Russia

The politician blames the Russian dictator for everything: the murder of her husband, the current state of affairs in Russia, and, of course, the war. He is portrayed as an all-powerful man with unlimited capabilities:

• Putin is a cowardly nobody — he blocked the website about the monument on [Navalny’s] grave
• Putin organized an attack on two courageous women [journalist Antonina Favorskaya and activist Olga Komleva]
• Putin released a “maniac” and “ripper” who participated in the SMO from prison
• Putin blocked YouTube
• Putin is “holding hostage” political prisoners
• Putin prevented Moldovan President Sandu from winning the election
• Putin is “driving the country into a dead end”…

She also writes about the “entourage,” “mafia,” “investigators,” and “censors” who assist Putin and are apparently in cahoots with him. This list clearly does not include the thousands of Russians who carry out Putin’s will. These individuals report on political prisoners and conduct “lessons on the most important things” (in Russia , “Уроки о главном” refers to a series of lessons organized by educational and youth/patriotic organizations to teach students about topics considered essential by the state – essentially ideological propaganda) alongside former killers, the “heroes of the SMO.” They vote for Putin in elections, and together with him, they “drive the country into a dead end.” Not to mention the pro-Russian politicians in Moldova who interfered with Maia Sandu.

Of course, the war in Ukraine is only Putin and his “entourage,” not Russian society. In this narrative, Navalnaya emphasizes that Putin and the Russian people must be distinguished from one another because, in her opinion, “the real Russia” is “against the war.” In a post reacting to events in Kursk, Navalnaya writes: 

“War has finally come to Russia. Putin and his entourage are to blame for this. Are they trying to help the local residents? Evacuate them, pay them normal compensation? No, they don’t give a damn about people. To them, human lives on both sides are worthless.”

In this post, Russians are portrayed as victims of Putin, even being equated with Ukrainians: “human lives on both sides.” This is similar to her article about Putin the gangster.

Navalnaya reiterates to Western politicians the idea that Putin and Russians are different:

• “I am glad that the British government understands that Putin is not Russia. The real Russia is against the war and in favor of a change of power.”
• “There are many Russians who oppose Putin and the war.”
• “It’s even more important and right that the members of the European Parliament, who represent 450 million Europeans, have expressed their solidarity with Russian civil society and all those who oppose Putin and his war by an overwhelming majority.” 

As it turns out, there is a civil society in Russia… 

“Against the war” and “Ukrainians should not invent an enemy out of the Russian opposition”

Navalnaya mentions the war. However, through her lens, it comes across as somewhat abstract. 

For example, here is her post about the third anniversary of Russia’s second campaign in the war against Ukraine — the full-scale invasion:

“Three years of a terrible war, tens of thousands killed, millions of lives ruined. On February 24, 2022, it seemed that the unthinkable had happened, that it simply couldn’t be — and yet, today, we are at a point where the unthinkable has been happening for three years. We must never forget this crime. We must remember not only the anniversary, but also every day. Today, February 24, anti-war protests are taking place around the world. Join them. Come out for the march on March 1. There must be many of us.”

Yes, war is terrible, but who is waging it? The war, for her, began on February 24 and has been going on “for three years,” not for over ten. It is a crime, but who are the criminals? Moreover, like her husband, Navalnaya is rather ambiguous about Russian aggression. It is unclear what “against the war” means. How exactly should it end?

Similarly, it is not always clear who the war is being waged against in many other posts. Only “the war in Ukraine” is mentioned. Russia, as the aggressor country, is never mentioned. Because Russia, they say, is not to blame; Putin is. 

For example, Navalnaya writes about the missile strike on the Okhmatdyt hospital.  She calls it a “horrific crime that is impossible to even imagine.” Those responsible are “Putin and his regime.” However, there is no mention of the Russians who carried out the strike.

As for Ukraine, our country is only mentioned only in the phrase “war in Ukraine.”  Ukraine is also mentioned a few times like this: “the whole world rushed to help Ukraine” (after February 24). It is also mentioned in a post about Ukrainians trying to disrupt her speech at the Web Summit. Addressing them, Navalnaya writes: “We have one enemy. And Ukrainians should not invent an enemy in the form of the Russian opposition.” 

In reality, however, we still have different enemies. Yulia Navalnaya’s enemy is Putin, while Ukraine’s enemy is Russia, which the opposition leader diligently whitewashes. 

So, what is Navalnaya’s political program?

According to the politician’s posts, everything is very simple: there’s Putin and his entourage, who want to steal. That is why they are waging war. We must take their money and give it to the Russian opposition and media, because they are honest and “love Russia.” They have proven this love by enduring persecution from “gangsters.” Alexei Navalny’s team will release several more investigations into corruption, opposition-minded Russians will tell those who love Putin about these investigations, and they will stop supporting him.

There are the good, simple Russian people and there is evil Putin. Remove Putin, put Navalnaya or someone else from the liberals in his place, and Russia would undergo rapid democratic change.

Putin and his entourage are to blame for the war. Ordinary Russians, just like the Russian military, are not to blame. They are hostages. They are also suffering. They should be pitied. Money should be invested in anti-war social advertising, because it is more effective than providing weapons to Ukrainians. Alexei Navalny himself wrote about this. 

In general, as one reads all this, one can’t help but wonder: do they themselves believe in this nonsense? Is it perhaps just some kind of psychological repression – to justify their monstrous, murderous country? Do they not see the “Russian boys” who launch missiles and Shahed drones at peaceful people in Ukraine, who poisoned civilians with gas in Syria? 

Then again, maybe it’s all just a subtle political game. 

I am inclined to believe that this is the case.

Like Putin, Navalnaya is offering Russians another sweet and beautiful fairy tale. 

“You give me hope,” she tells the Russians in her posts. “You are extraordinary.” The only killer is Putin, so relax. And this sells… Not very effectively, as we can see from the social media analysis. But for her team, it’s better than nothing.

But how does she intend to govern a country where people have never been told that killing simply because the state paid you to do so is wrong? That taking what belongs to others simply because you are stronger is not the norm? As Solzhenitsyn wrote, people in such a country live by the motto, “You die today, and I die tomorrow.” If Navalnaya really intends to return home after Putin, as she promises in many of her interviews, she will live in just such a Russia. 

We talk a lot about how harmful Navalnaya is to Ukraine. Ukrainians living abroad often protest during her and her daughter’s speeches. They try to explain to Europeans why they should not listen to her. 

But if we look at the situation objectively, Navalnaya is most harmful to Russians themselves. It’s not just Putin who is taking away their future. Navalnaya is, too.

Nataliia Steblyna,
Media analyst at the Pylyp Orlyk Institute for Democracy

(Top image – Youtube video screenshot – BBC World Service)